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LITIGATING SALVATION:
RACE, RELIGION AND INNOCENCE IN




"If you believe in it for one, you believe in it for everybody. If you
don't believe in it, don't believe in it for anybody."
-Karla Faye Tucker'
"My responsibility is to make sure our laws are enforced fairly and
evenly without preference or special treatment. "
-Then-Governor George W. Bush on his refusal to grant a reprieve to
Karla Faye Tucker2
The cases of Karla Faye Tucker and Gary Graham represent two
examples of the renewed public debate about the death penalty in the State
of Texas, and how religion and race affect that debate. This article
explores how the Tucker and Graham cases represent opposing possibilities
* Doctoral Candidate in Department of Political Science, University of Michigan; J.D. University of
Texas School of Law, 2002; B.S. cum laude Prairie View A&M University, 1995. In the fall of 2006, I
will join the faculty of the University of Kentucky College of Law. I would like to thank Jenny
Diamond-Cheng for her support of this work. I would also like to thank Louis Cicciarelli, the
Sweetland Writing Center Dissertation Institute, and my colleagues in the University of Michigan
Department of Political Science Political Theory Workshop for helping to shape this article. Also, I
thank John Newton, J.D., MSW for his eye for detail and sharp legal mind. Lastly, I thank my sister
and fellow Political Scientist, Melanye Price, Ph.D., for her constant willingness to read drafts.
1. E.R. Shipp, Where Was Pat Robertson for Other Executions?, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN,
Feb. 1, 1998, at H3.
2. R.G. Ratcliffe, The Execution of Karla Faye Tucker; Bush Prayed for Guidance Before
Denying Tucker's Appeal, HOU. CHRON., Feb. 4, 1998, at A10.
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for understanding contemporary narratives of the death penalty. Though
the juxtaposition of these two cases is not completely symmetrical, if
viewed as a kaleidoscope-a complex set of factors filtered through the
shifting identities of the person who is at the center of the immediate
case-the hidden operations of race and religion can be examined. Tucker
and Graham, both prosecuted in Houston's Harris County and executed in
relatively close proximity, demonstrate the function that race, religion and
gender play in current death penalty politics. Thus, the death penalty cases
of Karla Faye Tucker and Gary Graham inform an understanding of the
intersection of race and gender in current death penalty narratives and the
connection of those narratives to past tropes employed to justify the use of
the death penalty, in spite of its discriminatory impact on blacks. In
attempting to untangle the continuing impact of race and gender, the
increased reliance on religious narrative can be understood in relation to the
pro-death penalty arguments of the past.
These simple syllogisms, constructed above in the words of Karla
Faye Tucker and George W. Bush, logically demonstrate how individual
opinions on the death penalty can work in different cases. However, the
peculiarity of the supporters who came forward to ask for mercy in
Tucker's case contradicts the idea that, at least for some, the identity of the
defendant has no bearing on whether one supports or opposes the death
penalty. Commentator Julie H. Patton objected to the emphasis on Karla
Faye Tucker's gender instead of what she perceived to be the more
important issue: the inherent evil of capital punishment.3 Patton predicted,
"The protester who supported her [Tucker's] clemency because of her
religious conversion will most likely not be there when the next inmate is
walked to the death chamber."4 The cases of Tucker and Graham broke
rank and captured the attention of both individual citizens as well as
political and religious elites. However, the citizens, political and religious
elites were not the same in the two cases, race being the clearest distinction.
This article compares the Tucker and Graham cases and attempts to
position them as opposing ends of a spectrum of possibilities of how
religion may extend historical race and gender narratives into the present.
By setting these cases at odds and adopting narratives that overlap gender
and racial narratives, this article attempts to illuminate ways in which these
cases help us understand how death row inmates may be able to rehabilitate
3. Julie H. Patton, The Lost Issue in the Tucker Debate; Karla Faye Tucker's Execution Was
Unjust Because the Death Penalty is Unjust, Not Because She is a Woman Who Found God, TEX.
LAW., Feb. 16, 1998, at 36.
4. Id.
[Vol. 15:2
HeinOnline  -- 15 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 268 2005-2006
LITIGATING SAL VA TION
themselves and, in a sense, cleanse their personas as if they were innocent.
The reliance that contemporary narratives place on religion actually
obscures or reiterates the more obvious racial and gendered character of
past narratives to justify the death penalty. Religion is the new language of
the death penalty, but it is not divorced from the old.
II. ARE THERE POLITICAL AND LEGAL MEANINGS TO MORAL
TRANSFORMATION? HOW DO RACE AND RELIGION IMPACT
INDIVIDUAL DEATH ROW INMATES' ATTEMPTS AT
SALVATION?
This article began with one question: does moral transformation,
specifically religious transformation, have legal and political meaning? In
Harris County, Texas, "meaning" is not limited strictly to the symbolic, as
it may be in other states that have the death penalty but rarely execute
offenders. The relatively high number of executions in Texas in recent
years makes the death penalty part of the lived reality of the state's citizens.
Graham, whose execution followed Tucker's by almost two years, was the
222 " nperson executed in Texas since the brief moratorium after the 1972
case Furman v. Georgia.5 Continuing racial disparities make the issue
even more significant in Texas's African-American community, especially
in Harris County where eighty-nine defendants have been executed since
the resumption of the death penalty in 1982.6 Although this article
specifically focuses on the death penalty, its data contains explicit and
implicit critiques of the broader relationship between African Americans
and the criminal justice system.
This article begins with a description of the two cases around which
its analysis pivots. Graham and Tucker represent a fragile and problematic
dichotomy in this analysis because of their differences in identity and
proclaimed guilt or innocence. The first two sections describe the legal and
political landscape in which these two cases took place as a preface to an
analysis of why, despite certain asymmetries, the comparison is useful in
understanding race, religion and the death penalty in Texas.
5. 408 U.S. 238, 361 (1972).
6. A total of 322 men and women have been executed in Texas since 1982, when the death
penalty was reinstated after the moratorium initiated by Furman. This number is even more significant
when one realizes that there are 254 counties in the state of Texas, and the county with the next highest
number of executions, Dallas County, has only executed 28 people. Of the 454 inmates currently on
death row in Texas, 273 are from Harris County. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, County of
Conviction for Executed Offenders, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/countyexecuted.htm (last visited
May 5, 2006).
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 15 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 269 2005-2006
REVIEW OF LA WAND SOCIAL JUSTICE
A. GARY GRAHAM
"I would like to say that I did not kill Bobby Lambert. That I'm an
innocent black man that is being murdered. This is a lynching that is
happening in America tonight .... We must do everything we can to
outlaw legal lynching in America. "7
Graham, an African-American man, was convicted of killing Bobby
Lambert, a white man, on the night of May 13, 1981, in the parking lot of a
Safeway. 8 Bernadine Skillern testified at trial that she saw Graham murder
Lambert in the grocery store parking lot while she waited in her car for her
daughter, who was shopping inside.9 Of seven possible witnesses, Skillern
was the only one who identified Graham as the killer, making her
testimony critical to the prosecution's case.' ° Despite suggestions and even
threats by others to retract her testimony, Skillern remained steadfast in her
contention that Graham was the man she saw shoot and kill Bobby
Lambert. "
At the time the Lambert killing took place, Graham was on what
newspaper reports described as a six-day crime spree. 12 Despite pleading
guilty to ten other armed robberies in the same week, Graham consistently
proclaimed his innocence in the Lambert killing. 13 The robberies to which
he did confess included two non-fatal shootings, one in which a victim lost
his leg, and the rape and multiple sexual assaults of a fifty-nine year old
woman. 14 This rape led to Graham's capture seven days after Lambert was
7. Excerpts from Gary Graham's last words. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Executed
Offenders: Gary Graham, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/grahamgarylast.htm (last visited Aug. 10,
2005).
8. Anna Quindlen, Public & Private: Dead Man Walking, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1993, at A21;
Guillermo Garcia, Texas Inmate Struggles to the End; Courts Deny Last-Minute Civil Lawsuit, USA
TODAY, June 23, 2000, at 3A.
9. Bernadine Skillern was 30 to 40 feet away from Graham and testified that she saw him shoot
Bobby Lambert, while several other witnesses described the gunman as shorter than Graham. Andrea
Greene, Catholic Group Backs New Trialfor Death Row Inmate, HOu. CHRON., May 31, 1993, at A34.
10. See id.
11. See Norma Martin, Witness Against Graham Files Harassment Suit; Behavior of TV Crew Is
Called "Outrageous ", Hou. CHRON., May 20, 1993, at A26.
12. See Amy Dorsett & Kate Hunger, Capital Questions: As Execution Date Nears, Proof of
Houston Man's Guilt in Slaying Hinges on a Single Witness, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 11,
2000, at IA.
13. Greene, supra note 9.
14. Id. Even though his son was not killed in the robbery perpetrated by Graham, Franklin C.
Jones wrote a letter to the editor of the Houston Chronicle saying, "If anyone deserves the ultimate
penalty for his actions, Graham qualifies." Jones's son lost his leg and almost bled to death as a result
of injuries sustained in the robbery. Jones represented a small cadre of victims in the robberies who
[Vol. 15:2
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killed. 15 The rape occurred when Graham approached a female taxi driver
and asked to be driven to an apartment complex. 16 After she took Graham
to his destination, Graham pulled a gun and raped her.'7 Afraid she would
be murdered and never found, the taxi driver convinced Graham to take her
to her apartment.' 8 The police arrested Graham, who was found passed out
on her bed.' 9 Graham pled guilty to the robberies and was sentenced to
twenty years in prison.2" Police then noticed that Graham fit the
description of the perpetrator in the Lambert case and began questioning
the Safeway witnesses. 21 Despite pleading guilty to the previous offenses,
Graham always maintained he was innocent of the Lambert shooting.22
Much of the controversy in the Graham case focused on the
mishandling of the original trial, rather than on Graham's character.
Graham's lawyers failed to call the six other witnesses from the grocery
store who were unable to identify Graham in a photo array; the lawyers
also failed to call alibi witnesses.23 In fact, Graham's lawyers did not call
any witnesses during the entire guilt-innocence phase of the trial.24 During
the punishment phase of the trial, the prosecution called every person
victimized by Graham during his robbery spree, including the taxi driver, to
testify.25 The defense called only two witnesses, Graham's grandmother
and stepfather, who both testified that Graham was respectful.26 Graham's
grandmother, who had cared for him from ages three to ten, said, "He loved
the Lord, you know." 27 These reflections are a hard sell, to say the least, in
light of the parade of brutality marshaled by the prosecutor.
Gary Graham, though nearly forty years old when executed, was
convicted of capital murder at the age of seventeen. 28 Similar to Karla
spoke publicly in support of Graham's execution. See Franklin Jones, Letter to the Editor, Should Gary
Graham Get New Trial? He Deserves the Ultimate Penalty, HO. CHRON., July 24, 1993, at A31.













28. There was also significant post-conviction litigation over the trial court's refusal to allow the
jury to consider Graham's age as a mitigating factor at the time of his trial. See, e.g., Graham v.
Lynaugh, 854 F.2d 715, 717 (5th Cir. 1988) (describing Graham's unsuccessful argument that "his
2006]
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Faye Tucker, Graham had a troubled youth, which ended with the
perpetration of at least twenty-one other violent crimes and finally his
conviction for the murder of Bobby Lambert. 29 Graham not only fit the
description of the perpetrator of the crime of which he was convicted, but
he also fit the description of what the average American thinks of as a
capital murderer: young, black, male and violent, with previous criminal
offenses. 30  In many ways, his case is the prototypical death row story, as
was Tucker' s-except for the level of attention it garnered.
While on death row, Graham had a transformative spiritual
experience, however, the exact nature of Graham's experience is unclear
from media accounts. Unlike the rich description of Tucker's
transformation, there is very little documentation of Graham's conversion.
For example, a survey of national newspaper and magazine articles found
that, while many articles mentioned Graham's name change, only one
article mentioned when or why.31 He became Shaka Sankofa, though legal
documents, while acknowledging his new name, continued to refer to him
as Graham "for consistency." 32  The lack of description of Graham as a
whole person is surprising considering the level of attention paid to the
case. The reader is left with an incomplete picture of the person Graham
became while on death row.
The only discussion of Graham as a transformed person came from
black media sources. 33  For example, the Houston Defender, one of two
death sentence violate[d] the eighth amendment because he was seventeen at the time of the offense");
see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that defendants under the age of eighteen
could not be put to death).
29. By the time he arrived on death row, Graham had fathered two children. His son, Gary
Hawkins, who was two when his father went to death row, and with whom Graham had little contact,
was also convicted of capital murder in the year prior to his father's execution. See Bruce Nichols,
Death Row Inmate's Son Faces Judgment; He Could Join Father Gary Graham in Prison If Convicted
in Capital Case, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Apr. 13, 2000, at News IA.
30. In their research on race and media, Entman and Rojecki argue that the over-representation
of black perpetrators, under-representation of black victims, and over-representation of white victims in
local news intensifies negative stereotyping of blacks and "promotes anxiety and hostility in the
audience." See ROBERT ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND:
MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA 81-82 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2000). This anxiety is fed by the news
media, which "presents a face of Black disruption, of criminal victimizing and victimization, that
compares unfavorably with Whites." See id. at 209.
31. Using an extensive search of hundreds of articles from national and local newspapers,
magazines and some transcripts of news programs on Lexis, only a single article was found that
discussed this change or any characterizations of Graham, as a person, during the time leading to his
death. See Ashanti Chimurenga, I Remember Shaka, ESSENCE, Sept. 2001, at 114.
32. See, e.g., Graham v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 1999).
33. There are still two black newspapers, the Houston Defender and the Forward Times, archived
at the Houston Public Library. Lexis-Nexis includes the Houston Chronicle, which has been Houston's
[Vol. 15:2
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black newspapers in Houston, was the only source to report the time (1995)
and reason (a tribute to his African roots) for Graham's new moniker. 34
Additionally, these sources consistently referred to Graham's new name in
articles thereafter. The narratives presented by black media sources offered
more than the reasoning behind Graham's adoption of a new name. In an
article in Essence, a magazine targeted to African-American women,
Ashanti Chimurenga, a lawyer for Amnesty International who later
befriended Graham, quoted Graham describing himself as "a seventeen-
year-old young kid who didn't have much of a social conscience."35 In the
same piece, Chimurenga also characterized the Graham on death row as
having "overcome a cycle of pain stemming from childhood abuse and
neglect that led to adolescent drug addiction and violence," thus linking
Graham with a community's shared experience of being fit into a
pathological description of criminal behavior.
36
This link to a shared community experience may have motivated black
artists like the Geto Boys, a local rap group in Houston with national
notoriety, to hold benefit concerts for the Gary Graham Justice Coalition.
37
The Geto Boys stated their reasons for such communal events:
We are trying to unite the youth through this effort and raise their
consciousness of the situation .... The youths will listen to rappers, and
we hope to make them aware of what's going on in the judicial system.38
The positioning of Graham in the foreground of African-American
narratives may have been due to a sense of kinship with Graham's
precarious relationship to the state. That relationship ended for Graham
with his execution on June 22, 2000.39  Unlike the funerals of most
executed inmates, Gary Graham's funeral was attended by scores of
only daily for more than a decade, as well as Essence and Jet magazines, both geared to a black
audience. This finding is compatible with research on black counter-publics: separate institutional
spaces for black political debate, the most important being the black church followed closely by the
black press. See generally MICHAEL DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-
AMERICAN POLITICS (Princeton Univ. Press 1994).
34. See Michica Guillory, Execution for Gary Graham; Date Would Be Set for June, Hou.
DEFENDER, May 7-13, 2000, at 1.
35. See Chimurenga, supra note 31, at 114.
36. See id. at 222.
37. See Earnest L. Perry, Local Rappers Plan Concert to Support Murderer Graham, HOU.
CHRON., May 27, 1993, at B23; see also Sheila Rule, Rap to the Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1993, at
C16.
38. See Perry, supra note 37.
39. See Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Executed Offenders,
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/executedoffenders.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 15 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 273 2005-2006
REVIEW OF LA WAND SOCIAL JUSTICE
people.4' The enormous turnout was explained by one member of the
largely black crowd:
There's a lot of us didn't know him personally, but it was like we have
seen over the years how innocent people, especially blacks, have been
convicted of crimes they weren't guilty of 4'
Graham became a kind of Every-black-man, representing to the black
community the abuses enacted on them through the criminal justice system.
Opaque news accounts offered little that would allow readers to see beyond
Graham's crime and rendered him as invisible as the cadres of young black
men ensnared in the criminal justice system. Graham himself asserted that
he had a message for young, incarcerated blacks: like himself, they had the
potential to be transformed "into a force that could uplift mind, spirit, and
soul."42
The focus on Graham's alleged innocence was heightened nationally
when he became political fodder in George W. Bush's presidential
candidacy. Similar to Willie Horton,43 Graham's image as an individual
was subverted to a need to punctuate the presidential candidate's tough-on-
crime attitude. Unlike Willie Horton, where those on the left could only
point to the implicit racial appeal of the campaign strategy, the call to save
Graham became a tool of the left in their effort to embarrass George W.
Bush on his death penalty record as governor of Texas.44 As one writer for
Texas Monthly wrote, "Q. When does a Texas story become a national
story? A. When the New York Times says it does.",45 Consequently, the
increasing viability of George W. Bush's presidential bid swept Graham up
into the consuming campaign media circus. Local black activists lobbying
for relief in the Graham case were aware of the importance of the death
penalty in the presidential campaign.46 Robert Muhammad, the Southwest
regional representative of the Nation of Islam, was quoted at a rally in
support of Graham saying, "Don't forget the road to the White House goes
40. See Bruce Nichols, Protest Marks Graham Service; High-Profile Guests Assail Death
Penalty, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, June 29, 2000, at 23A.
41. Id.
42. See Chimurenga, supra note 31, at 113.
43. See generally TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT
MESSAGES AND THE NORMS OF EQUALITY (2001) (discussing the political impact of Willie Horton).
44. See Nichols, supra note 40.
45. Jordan Mackay, Sign of the Times, TEX. MONTHLY, Jan. 1999, at 16.
46. See Michica Guillory, Graham Faces Execution: Rallies and Vigils Planned January 11Ph,
Hou. DEFENDER, Jan. 10-16, 1999, at I.
[Vol. 15:2
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through Huntsville."47 Nevertheless, the attention to Graham cannot be
read as simple electioneering.
Calls for clemency came from a diverse cross-section of national
leaders and celebrities, such as Danny Glover and Kenny Rogers, who held
no direct ties to politics.48 Other significant advocates included clergy,
ranging from Pope John Paul II to local black clergymen to Reverend
Joseph Fiorenza, the Bishop of the Houston-Galveston Diocese. 49 Many of
these participants had been advocates for Graham through several
execution dates. For example, Reverend Jew Don Boney, a minister and
activist who would later become a member of the Houston City Council,
led the local campaign to save Graham and asked "the spiritual leadership
of the community" to contribute prayers and influence to Graham's
cause.50 Boney argued that "there [was] a power in the soul force, and
that's the kind of power [they] were trying to exert.",51 Responding to the
suggestion that Houston's summer temperatures in the mid-nineties made
the rally's timing less than ideal, Reverend James Dixon remarked, "We
will sweat for justice." 52 None of these figures, however, could match the
media whirlwind created by the arrival of Reverends Jesse Jackson and Al
Sharpton in Texas near Graham's final execution date.53  Jackson and
Sharpton brought their public notoriety and political clout to the national
media campaign and both spoke at Graham's funeral.54 However, the dual
role of black ministers as both political and religious leaders in the black
community has been reconfigured by the national media to make them
primarily political figures. 5
5
47. Id. Huntsville is the location of the execution chamber.
48. Though only reported in the Houston Defender, Glover went to Texas nine times between
1993 and 2000 to advocate on Graham's behalf. See Michica Guillory, Glover Back to Defend
Graham: I Thought His Life Had Been Spared, Hou. DEFENDER, Feb. 21-27, 1999, at 1.
49. See Matt Kantz, Pope Again Asks for Clemency for Texan Gary Graham, NAT'L CATH. REP.,
Oct. 29, 1999, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-ml 141/is_2_36/ai-57589364/pg_3.
50. See Susan Warren, Graham Supporters Renew Attention as Two Key Court Rulings Are
Pending, HOU. CHRON., Mar. 12, 1994, at A29.
51. Id.
52. Susan Warren, Graham Supporters Rally at City Hall, HoU. CHRON., Jul. 11, 1993, at A24.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., Editorial, Capital Punishment: Many Will Continue to Doubt Graham's Guilt,
HOu. CHRON., June 23, 2000, at A36 [hereinafter Capital Punishment]; Editorial, Capital Punishment:
Lifeless Debate, NAT'L REV., July 17, 2000 [hereinafter Lifeless Debate]; Garcia, supra note 8.
55. The perception of black clerics as primarily political when they enter mainstream politics
also may be encouraged by attempts of the clerics themselves to make their message palatable to a
wider audience. One only has to reflect on the Al Sharpton sans sweat suit of the 2004 presidential
election and then look further to the Al Sharpton of his earlier grassroots period. The most extensive
research on the issue of the image of black ministers in public life focuses on Jesse Jackson's
presidential campaigns. In his analysis of Jackson's speaking style during the 1984 presidential
2006]
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Unlike Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, who can bring an aura of
religion/morality when they enter the political fray, Jackson and Sharpton's
identities as religious figures are obscured by the prevailing perception of
them as primarily political. This in turn obscures the meaning of religion
in the death penalty issue. The presence of Sharpton and Jackson, who
were also present at Graham's execution,56 did not foment any greater
attention to religion or to what it was about Graham that warranted their
attention. Graham's invisibility is even more striking when compared to
the religious spotlight on Karla Tucker, triggered by the presence of the
Reverends Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, who served as advocates for
her clemency. The absence of Graham's humanity and the silence of the
mainstream narratives on his transformation is relevant when examining
how African Americans understand the death penalty. In the national
media, Graham simply became the background to a foreground story of a
murderer who was unrepentant for his crime.
B. KARLA FAYE TUCKER
"Yes sir, I would like to say to all of you--the Thornton family and
Jerry Dean's family that I am so sorry. I hope God will give you peace
campaign, Charles Henry argues that Jackson "moved from an African-American preacher-cum-
American politician to an American politician utilizing the expressive characteristics of black sermon
performance to achieve his goals." CHARLES HENRY, CULTURE AND AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICS 77
(Ind. Univ. Press 1990). Jesse Jackson's role as both a religious and a political leader has been
criticized by scholars of black politics, particularly Adolph Reed. In his critique of Jackson's 1984
presidential campaign, Reed rejected the predominant view that religion encourages political
participation in the black community and instead argued that "Afro-Christianity" encourages "political
quietism" among blacks. See ADOLPH REED, JR., THE JESSE JACKSON PHENOMENON: THE CRISIS OF
PURPOSE IN AFRO-AMERCAN POLITICS (Yale Univ. Press 1986). In his seminal work on religion and
African-American political activism, Something Within, Fred Harris further summarized Reed's
argument, describing the reliance on ministers for political leadership "as authoritarian and the tradition
of the black church as antidemocratic." See FREDERICK C. HARRIS, SOMETHING WITHIN: RELIGION IN
AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL ACTIVISM 6 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999). The debate over the impact of
clerical leadership on African-American political behavior can be traced back to DuBois, Lincoln and
Frazier, who all agreed that religion was impacting black political participation but who make separate
claims about the actual impact. See generally W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLKS (Bedford
Books 1903); E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO CHURCH IN AMERICA (Shocken Books 1963); C.
ERIC LINCOLN, THE BLACK CHURCH SINCE FRAZIER (Shocken Books 1964). More recent studies show
that the scholars who asserted that black religion led to political quietism were partially correct. Recent
work by Allison Calhoun Brown has found that church attendance does not determine the level of
religious participation among blacks, but that attendance in a political church can be determinative. See
Allison Calhoun-Brown, African American Churches and Political Mobilization: The Physiological
Impact of Organizational Resources, 58 J. POL. 935, 935-53 (1996).
56. See Nichols, supra note 40.
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with this .... I love you all very much. I am going face to face with Jesus
now. -57
The life of Karla Faye Tucker played out in a tragic fashion-similar
to Graham's life, to the lives of many who have shared their fate in the
Texas death chamber, and to the lives of those who continue to reside on
death row-including a dysfunctional childhood, substance abuse and
previous criminal involvement. When compared to Graham's story,
Tucker's story is both similar and totally unique. The most obvious
distinctions between the two are that Tucker was a woman and white.
Although there is a longer history of executing women in this country than
many might guess, the execution of women is still rare, even in Texas
which has averaged nearly thirty executions per year for the last five
years.5 8 When author Beverly Lowry first met Tucker, after Tucker had
been on death row for nearly five years, her first impression was that "she
[Tucker] seemed more like maybe, thirteen, a transitional girl."59 This is
not a prototypical or expected description of someone who murdered two
people with a pickaxe and bragged to friends that she experienced sexual
pleasure while doing so. 60  By the end of Tucker's life, no one could
reconcile the beautiful young woman whose conversation was laced with
religious praise with the individual guilty of brutal murders that she never
denied committing. 61 Tucker's admission of guilt in her crimes was as
adamant as Graham's denial of guilt.
On June 12, 1983, Karla Faye Tucker and her accomplice, Daniel
Ryan Garrett, entered the home of Jerry Lynn Dean, where he and a woman
lay sleeping. 62 Tucker bludgeoned both to death with a pickaxe, which she
57. Excerpt from Karla Faye Tucker's last words. Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Executed Offenders: Karla Faye Tucker, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/tuckerkarlalast.htm (last visited
Jan. 29, 2006).
58. Karla Tucker was only the second woman and the first white woman to be executed in the
State of Texas. The woman executed prior to Tucker was an innkeeper named Chipita Rodriguez, who
was hanged for the murder of one of her patrons. In 1985, the legislature passed a bill clearing her
name. See Ellen Goodman, Karla Tucker Gave Death Row a Human Face, HOU. CHRON., Feb.15,
1998, at Outlook 6. For a complete list of women executed between 1900 and 2004 (totaling only
forty-nine compared to 915 men between 1976 and 2004 alone), see Death Penalty Information Center,
Women Executed in the U.S. since 1900, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=24&did=229
(last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
59. See BEVERLY LOWRY, CROSSED OVER: A MEMOIR, A MURDER 25 (1992).
60. See Marianne Means, No Gender Lines Exist in Use of Death Penalty, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESs-NEWS, Jan. 20, 1998, at B7.
61. See LOWRY, supra note 59, at 242 ( "Karla never removes herself from blame or
responsibility.").
62. Gregory Curtis, Forgiveness and the Law, TEX. MONTHLY, Sept. 1988, at 135.
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left lodged in the woman's chest.63 Tucker and Garret probably would not
have been caught, but they boasted about the crime to friends. 64 This was
the culmination of Tucker's extremely troubled life. Karla Faye Tucker
had a history of drug use that dated back to pre-adolescence. 65 By the age
of fourteen, she had been on the road with rock bands and encouraged by
her mother into prostitution.66 At only twenty-three years old, she was on
death row. 67 Charley Davidson, the chief prosecutor in the case against
Tucker's accomplice, remembered "seeing [Tucker] ... and having the gut
reaction that she was the embodiment of evil."68 After Tucker's spiritual
transformation, Davidson later stated, "the Karla Tucker who remains on
death row is a completely different person who, in my opinion, is not
capable of those atrocities."69 It was as if the free-world Karla Faye were a
completely distinct person from the affable woman on death row. In some
important ways, though, she was. On death row, Karla Faye was born
again and married a prison minister, Dana Brown. 70 Still, her astonishing
rehabilitation was no salvation from the Texas death chamber. Governor
George W. Bush denied her request for a thirty day reprieve, citing his own
spiritual reasons.71 At the press conference announcing his denial, Bush
explained:
Like many touched by this case, I have sought guidance through
prayer... I have concluded judgments about the heart and soul of an
individual on death row are best left to a higher authority .... May God
bless Karla Faye Tucker, and may God bless her victims and their
families.72
Religion clearly influenced both the governor's decision-making and
Tucker's supporters in different and complex ways. Tucker was asking for
63. Id. "Tucker continued to hack at her victims long after they were dead and left the pickax
sticking out of the woman's chest. Hardened police officers were haunted for years afterward by the
carnage." Id.
64. Id.
65. See LOWRY, supra note 59, at 121-22; see also Christy Hoppe, Woman's Execution Looms,
Stirring National Discussion Gender, Rehabilitation Add to Debate in Texas Case, DALLAS MORN.
NEWS, Jan. 13, 1998, at IA ("A heroin abuser at age 10, Ms. Tucker became a teenage prostitute.").
66. LOWRY, supra note 59, at 124-25.
67. Id.
68. Kathy Walt & T.J. Milling, Karla Faye's Last Chance; Words on Life or Death, Hou.
CHRON., Feb. 1, 1998, at A14.
69. See id.
70. Karla Faye Tucker was married to Dana Brown, whom she met through a prison ministry.
Christy Hoppe, State Urged to Spare Karla Faye Tucker, Minister Married to Killer, Rock Singer's Ex-
Wife Lead Call for Clemency, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Jan. 18, 1998, at 24A.
71. See Ratcliffe, supra note 2.
72. Id.
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clemency, based on her own religious transformation, from a governor who
would later promote his own "born-again" experience that "made him fit to
assume state, national, and international leadership." 73 Tucker and then-
Governor Bush used religion to articulate divergent political perspectives.
In the end, however, the legal and political will aligned with the
Governor's perspective when Karla Faye Tucker was executed on February
3, 1998.7 She was thirty-nine years old.75
To the public, Tucker's story was one of transformation. Though her
life was not spared, Tucker's personal transformation through religious
faith morally repaired her and cleansed her public image.76 The new Karla
Tucker, the one that prosecutor Donaldson and the rest of the viewing
public observed, was not easily characterized as the "other," unlike many
narratives of death row inmates. 77 One reporter described her:
Her peculiar little person was all contradiction. She was sunny and nice,
and she gave you the creeps. She was an innocent who was a guilty
criminal. She was evil, and she was embraced by religious leaders who
declared she was good.78
By far one of the most debated and watched death penalty cases in
recent history, Tucker's execution and transformation reveals important
racial and gender connotations captured in accounts of the case.
Though religion was central to Tucker's personal metamorphosis and
resulting public reception, Tucker's race and gender were even more
important to that public image. Though she may not have been the first
death row inmate to experience a religious conversion, Tucker was the first
white woman to be executed in Texas's history.79 The rich descriptions of
Tucker in media accounts stand in sharp contrast to the spare accounts
provided of Graham. Through the media, a sense of Tucker as a person
emerges, and one gets a sense of her impact on the reporters themselves. 80
For example, the above account provides the reader with a strong sense of
73. See Paula M. Cooey, Women's Religious Conversions on Death Row: Theorizing Religion
and State, 70 J. ACAD. RELIGION 699, 700 (2002) (discussing the role of religion and conversion in
death penalty cases).
74. See Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Executed Offenders,
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/executedoffenders.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
75. Id.
76. See Walt & Milling, supra note 68; see also Hoppe, supra note 70.
77. See Francine Banner, Rewriting History: The Use of Feminist Narratives to Deconstruct the
Myth of the Capital Defendant, 26 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 569, 580 (2000).
78. Curtis, supra note 62.
79. See supra text accompanying note 58.
80. See Curtis, supra note 62.
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Tucker's humanity, especially in the difficulty reconciling Tucker's
humanity with her crime. The reader has a sense of Tucker's
appearance--attractive, young and feminine--but there is no mention of
her race or its impact in her case. The reader likely knows the particulars
of her brutal crime-she killed two people with a pick-axe--but knows
nothing of the criminal proceedings in which she was convicted. Many
articles on Tucker inevitably mention her physical appearance, the pick-axe
and that she was born-again.8 1 These supporting facts, however, are
subordinated to the central story: Tucker's transformation. The particulars
of her crime and her identity are lost in the story of the pretty, young
woman who murdered two people with a pick-axe and found Jesus on the
Texas death row.
C. ARE THESE THE MODELS? THE BENEFIT OF LOOKING AT CONCRETE
CASES
The Graham and Tucker cases represent models of how death row
inmates may, at least in the public sphere, rehabilitate themselves with
religion. Concrete cases are beneficial, despite or perhaps because of the
differences that exist between the compared individuals. In this section, the
Graham and Tucker cases are examined in an attempt to position them as
opposing ends of a spectrum of possibilities of how religion may extend
historical race and gender narratives into the present. Even though many
accounts make little of Tucker's gender and even less of her race, the
absence of such commentary should be considered in relation to accounts
of Graham. Like many inmates on death row,82 Graham was male and a
racial minority. The operation of masculinity, especially black masculinity,
is very different than the gender norms that may have aided the public's
acceptance of Tucker's transformation. Comparison of the Graham and
Tucker cases is important because both have fuelled the contemporary
debate over the death penalty in Texas and nationally.
In analyzing the "the power of concrete cases," authors Samuel Gross
and Phoebe Ellsworth83 begin with Justice Thurgood Marshall's
formulation of the requirements for a Constitutional death penalty regime,
81. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 58; LOWRY, supra note 59; Curtis, supra note 62; Hoppe,
supra note 65.
82. See U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics: Capital Punishment Statistics,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cp.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2006).
83. See Samuel R. Gross & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Second Thought: Americans' Views on the
Death Penalty at the Turn of the Century, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 38
(Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).
[Vol. 15:2
HeinOnline  -- 15 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 280 2005-2006
LITIGATING SAL VA TION
as articulated in Furman v. Georgia.84 In Furman, Marshall decided that a
death penalty would be unconstitutional if "people who were fully
informed as to the purposes of the [death penalty] and its liabilities would
find the penalty shocking, unjust, and unacceptable."85 Marshall argued
that since the average American knows little to nothing about the actual
operation of the death penalty, "indifference and ignorance" result.86 Gross
and Ellsworth argue that this is incorrect since "surveys repeatedly show
that many Americans believe that the death penalty does not deter murder,
that it is administered unfairly and it is used in a manner that discriminates
against minorities and poor people-but they support it nonetheless. '" 87
However, Gross and Ellsworth agree that Marshall was partially correct
when stating that "in the context of concrete cases, learning about the
operation of capital punishment in practice does sometimes shock people's
conscience and offend their sense of justice. 88
The idea that viewing concrete cases in a particular context can
influence existing attitudes about the death penalty-even though Gross
and Ellsworth examined the recent attention given to innocent defendants
released from death row by DNA evidence-promotes an analysis of the
Graham and Tucker cases to study the effects of the death penalty on
African Americans in Texas. 89  The Graham and Tucker cases share
similarities that make this comparison particularly useful. First, as stated
earlier, both Graham and Tucker were executed in relatively close
proximity and were convicted in the same jurisdiction.90 In both cases, the
debate over their executions took place. in similar political climates,
including the same governor and the same district attorney.91 In addition,
the victims in both cases were white men.92  Finally, the historical
narratives this project draws from-the history of gender and race in the
Jim Crow93 South-view race and gender as inextricably intertwined.
84. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361 (1972).
85. Id. at 361.
86. See id. at 361 n.145.
87. See Gross & Ellsworth, supra note 83.
88. Id. at 39.
89. Id. Gross and Ellsworth note the overlooked fact that DNA has played a role in only about
10% of the cases where innocent defendants have been exonerated. Whether true, false, or slightly
misinformed, the accounts of the Tucker and Graham cases are similar to the discussion of DNA
evidence in the way that race, religion and gender play out in that discussion. Id.
90. See supra notes 8-81 and accompanying text.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. The origin of the term "Jim Crow" is unknown, but the moniker is given to a whole host of
formal legal codes and informal social codes that ruled the behavior of blacks and whites in the South.
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From emancipation well into the twentieth century, the prevailing
justification for the lynching and execution of black men was the protection
of "virtuous white women." While this justification may not exist today,
an explication of current norms associated with these identities is warranted
when analyzing cases of inmates who hold such identities in this region.
Due to a history of mistreatment, blacks, as well as social scientists,
continue to understand the criminal justice system as it treats them relative
to the treatment of whites; therefore, the comparison of Graham and
Tucker, the two most visible cases in recent years, closely aligns with that
tradition.
Ideally, cases used for comparison would involve similarly heinous
crimes committed by defendants of the same gender whose trials proceeded
with roughly equal levels of fairness, isolating race and religion. The
criminal justice system, however, is not a laboratory where one can
manipulate factors of interest in a controlled environment. In fact, the
asymmetry of the Tucker and Graham cases highlights the racial and
gender contradictions embedded in the different ways religion is woven
into these narratives. The attention given to Tucker's case ignited a public
debate about the death penalty in a state where regular executions were and
remain the order of the day; this debate reached a fevered pitch when the
execution of Gary Graham coincided with George W. Bush's presidential
campaign. The consistently high level of execution and willingness to act
against emerging trends toward leniency94 in this area of law continues to
make Texas the epicenter of the death penalty debate well past the
execution of Graham.
With Tucker's execution impending and two years before Graham's
execution, Texas reporter Carlos Guerra described the impact on Texas
residents of such frequent use of capital punishment:
Since Texas resumed executions in 1982, 145 people have died, and we
hardly notice anymore .... The following day, the reports will probably
Jim Crow laws date from roughly the 1890s until their legal and political vestiges were dismantled in
the 1960s. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1974). This
paper asks whether the legal vestiges of Jim Crow remain in the death penalty.
94. A notable recent example of this is the execution of Napoleon Beasley. Napoleon was
convicted of capital murder at age seventeen. There was considerable national legal debate about, and
international condemnation of, the execution of children. Texas moved forward with the execution of
Napoleon Beasley despite movement by the Supreme Court to review this issue in the following
session. See Stephanie Simon, Court Puts Age, Crime on Scales, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2002, at A20. In
2005, the Supreme Court held the execution of minors under age 18 unconstitutional. Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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tell more about what they ordered for a last meal than about their lives,
because Texas executions have become so common.95
The controversy surrounding Graham and Tucker disrupted this
described pattern. Arguably, both cases are not only anomalous to each
other but, in light of this reporter's assessment, they are anomalous to the
vast majority of Texas death penalty cases. However, concrete cases do
not necessarily need to be representative to affect the public's perception of
the death penalty. For instance, death row inmates exonerated due to DNA
evidence represent only about 10% of the total persons freed, though the
public probably imagines that figure is higher.96 Though DNA-innocence
cases are not necessarily representative of all innocence cases, this new
technology has captured the public's attention, particularly the way in
which it undermines the legitimacy of the death penalty.97 Similarly, while
arguably Graham and Tucker are not representative of the vast majority of
Texas death penalty cases, their impact as concrete cases is not diminished.
In fact, the Graham and Tucker cases become quite revealing of the way
religion operates in the context of contemporary racial inequality.
Moving forward, Gross and Ellsworth raise a caveat in this reasoning:
Would many Americans care if they learned that a death row inmate who
was in fact guilty of a vicious multiple murder had a defense attorney
who never talked to him, or a prosecutor who lied, or was arrested
because of his race?98
The Graham and Tucker cases demonstrate that, while Americans may
not care in any systematic way if the processes under which the guilty
receive the death penalty are flawed, they may care in particular instances.
In the Houston area, where Graham and Tucker's deaths would have been
nothing out of the ordinary, the heavy media coverage surrounding both
cases indicates that people cared. Thus, despite arguments for the utility of
this comparison, it is worth understanding the major arguments against the
comparison and how those arguments, if refrained, may actually contribute
to the analysis.
95. See Carlos Guerra, We Hardly Blink at Executions Anymore, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Feb.
6, 1998, at A13.
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III. THE DIFFICULTY IN COMPARING THESE CASES
A. DIFFERENCES IN GENDER AND/OR RACE
Karla Faye Tucker was a white woman. Gary Graham was a black
man. This is an obvious truth about the identity of these people, but it is
not obvious how this difference impacted the public debate over their
executions. For example, the majority of accounts of the Tucker case tend
to focus on her gender and her miraculous transformation.99 Thus, an
argument against comparing the Tucker and Graham cases is that the social
norms that influence public support or disapproval of execution are
different for men and women. While this may be a valid argument, these
norms do not exist in isolation. They are part of a larger narrative that
ascribes different values to the lives of men and women and blacks and
whites. But in the context of the Southern historical narrative, race and
gender cannot be separated, especially when one speaks of white women,
black men and the death penalty.
Legions of historians have documented the need to understand the
history of race and gender in the post-emancipation South as systems of
oppression that operated in tandem. For example, in Gender and Jim
Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in South Carolina,
1896-1920, author Glenda Gilmore chronicles her own realization that
"gender and race were no less intertwined in men's politics than they were
in women's" in the South. 1°0 Gilmore argues that "naturaliz[ing] white
women's purity" was as much a part of the Southern white supremacist
project as "naturaliz[ing] black men's impurity."10 1 The need to maintain
the racial order meant upholding the purity of white women at all costs.
The incontrovertible accusation of rape by white women meant sure and
swift death for most accused blacks, using legal and extra-legal means. 102
Although no one can be executed for rape under current Constitutional
understanding,10 3 there continues to be a high correlation between the race
of the victim, the race of the defendant and the likelihood of conviction in
capital cases. For example, in Texas black offenders who murder white
99. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
100. See GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF
WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920, at xvi (1996).
101. Seeid. at 72.
102. See. e.g., id. at 91-118; see also PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK SEXUAL POLITICS:
AFRICAN AMERICANS, GENDER AND THE NEW RACISM 61-65 (2004).
103. See Coker v. Georgia, 422 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that the death penalty for the crime
of rape of an adult violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
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victims are eighty-seven times more likely to receive the death penalty than
other categories of defendants convicted of capital murder. 10 4 While this
article does not intend to draw a connection between the discrimination that
led to the Jim Crow criminal justice system and current racial disparities,
facts such as the one above show the perpetuation of valuation according to
race and gender in our current criminal justice system.
In fact, scholars focusing on contemporary black masculinity allude to
the positioning of African-American men (especially young men) inside
and outside of the black community as problematic. 0 5 Usually, they are
characterized as dangerous.'016 While statistics could be used to justify the
pervasiveness of the perception of African-American men as "criminal,"
this article is more concerned with meaning than with various, perhaps
skewed constructions of reality. The death penalty is a small but extremely
meaningful part of a larger criminal justice system that legal theorist
Patricia Hill Collins argues developed in the antebellum period "to curtail
the citizenship rights of African-American men."10 7 According to Collins's
recent work, Black Sexual Politics, "the controlling image of Black men as
criminals or as deviants" has normalized the incarceration and execution of
black men.'08  This may explain why Graham's execution seemed to be
business as usual, while Tucker's execution seemed extraordinary. Thus,
within the hierarchy of race and gender in the U.S., specifically in the
South, Tucker did not fit within the description or category of people
normally executed.
The analysis that accompanied Tucker's case tended to ignore race,
instead focusing on gender, especially Tucker's treatment versus men. 109
Because of the historical entanglement of race and gender, analysis of the
Tucker and Graham cases must look at the impact of their combined gender
and race on the disposition of their cases. While some studies may
examine gender without attention to race or examine race without attention
104. See, e.g., William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under
Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980).
105. See generally COLLINS, supra note 102.
106. Id. at 158.
107. See id. at 219.
108. Id. at 158.
109. See, e.g., Chimene I. Keitner, Victim or Vamp? Images of Violent Women in the Criminal
Justice System, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 38 (2002); Jenny E. Carroll, Images of Women and Capital
Sentencing Among Female Offenders: Exploring the Outer Limits of the Eighth Amendment and
Articulated Theories of Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1413 (1997); Melinda E. O'Neil, The Gender Gap
Argument: Exploring the Disparity of Sentencing Women to Death, 25 NEw ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 213 (1999); Andrea Shapiro, Unequal Before the Law: Men, Women and the Death
Penalty, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 427 (1999).
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to gender, the tremendous focus on Tucker's appearance, for instance,
demonstrates why such academic isolation is problematic; instead of
focusing on the role her whiteness played in the effort to save Tucker's life,
analysis instead focused on nonracial aspects of her appearance. El Paso
minister Cal Thomas asked whether Tucker would have received the
support of conservative religious leaders like Pat Robertson "if she had
converted to some other faith, or, for that matter, if she had been of some
other race or a man?"" 0 Thomas asserted that Tucker received so much
attention because she was "pretty, young, white and female-four
characteristics that tug at the heartstrings of a culture that values them."
' 1I
Thus, the value of white femininity is magnified in a culture that privileges
those with this particular identity. Moreover, Thomas rightly asks: "How
many homely, black, male, or older convicts enjoy the defense of such
high-profile religious leaders as the Rev. Pat Robertson?"'
112
This question becomes obvious in the context of modem American
culture. In Texas, this question is a prerequisite for understanding the role
of religion and race in the legitimization of the death penalty as
punishment. As quoted above, Thomas is justified in asking why American
society places a premium on beauty, whiteness and femininity. The Tucker
case demonstrates the strong valuation of these qualities-they even
privilege a woman who committed brutal, heinous acts.1 13  Tucker was
privileged by being made visible, and thus distanced from the "othering"
that is part of the psychology of state execution.114 While execution
certainly cannot be considered a privilege, the outcry for mercy in Tucker's
case, compared to the racially charged standoff in the Graham case,
suggests a difference in the valuation of these two people. Tucker's lawyer
challenged the possibility of mercy through the clemency process:
We all know that Texas doesn't have any mercy .... Mercy is the
fragrance that clings to the boot that just crushed Karla Faye Tucker. 115
110. See Cal Thomas, Editorial, Flawed Reasoning in Sparing Tucker, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-
NEWS, Jan. 26, 1998, at 11 A.
111. See id.
112. Seeid.
113. It seems important to mention that, despite any social or gender advantage Tucker may have
had, she was still executed. Making such comparisons of advantage or status in the area of capital
punishment is extremely difficult because it is unclear where or how one marks the meaning of
advantage.
114. See Keitner, supra note 109, at 40.
115. See Nancy Donisi, Tucker 's Lawyer Still Backs Death Penalty, Attorney Speaks at Arlington
Seminar, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Feb. 7, 1998, at IA.
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The lack of legal or political relief increases the importance of the
narrative that surrounds an individual case, as well as emphasizes the
similarities in position of two defendants navigating the legal process. In
the end, one must question the political and legal structure that led a
prosecutor to change his mind in the Tucker case, but to argue in the
Graham case that "to have Graham as the poster child to end the death
penalty is like having Frankenstein for a poster child for the March of
Dimes."1 16
B. WHAT DO YOU PLEA? POST-CONVICTION CLAIMS OF GUILT AND
INNOCENCE
The other important argument against comparing the Graham and
Tucker cases derives from the defendants' different postures toward their
crimes at the time of execution. Graham proclaimed his innocence in the
murder of Bobby Lambert with his dying breath. 117 In his last statement,
which was reported to have lasted six minutes (lengthy in comparison to
most statements), Graham used the word innocent and alluded to his
innocence or lynching fourteen times."l8 Intermingled with thanks to his
family, supporters and the black community, the repeated theme of his
statement-his innocence-emerges:
I'm innocent. They've got the facts to prove it. They know I'm
innocent. But they cannot acknowledge my innocence, because to do so
would be to publicly admit their guilt. This is something these racist
people will never do.119
In proclaiming his innocence, Graham inherently critiques the system
that placed him on the gurney and the individuals that represented that
system. His proclamation of innocence becomes more than a statement of
his factual lack of guilt; it becomes an act of defiance.
Tucker, on the other hand, admitted her guilt early on and never
denied committing the murders for which she was convicted. At rallies to
spare her life, Tucker called for a change in the death penalty system and
"compassion for the people hurting because of the violence done to
them."' 20 At the time of her execution, Tucker appeared resigned to her
116. See Sam Gideon Anson & David Cogan, A Death in Texas: An "Ordinary" Execution Gets
Completely Out of Hand, L.A. WEEKLY, June 30, 2000, at 21.
117. See Texas Department of Criminal Justice, supra note 7.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Hoppe, supra note 65.
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fate and, unlike Graham, she seemed to have a positive relationship with
her jailers, as expressed in her last statement:
Warden Baggett, thank all of you so much. You have been so good to
me. I love all of you very much.
121
A witness to Tucker's execution testified that he "never saw Karla
Faye Tucker take the smile off her face."'122 Tucker had a consistent
narrative: she was guilty, and then she was born again. The differences in
Graham and Tucker's claims of innocence and guilt only obscure the fact
that they were engaged in the same legal process, even if their claims
positioned them differently politically.
At first glance, the claims of innocence and guilt seem to complicate
the comparison, both because of the importance innocence has played in
the recent debate over the death penalty and because of the ethical
commitment not to execute innocent people. The remainder of this article
deconstructs the idea of a singular definition of innocence in death penalty
narratives. For the moment, let us hold to the vernacular definition of
innocence as "you did not do it." Arguably, many people who support the
death penalty would be troubled by the possibility of executing an innocent
person, that is, a person who did not commit the crime. By claiming
innocence, Graham placed himself in a different category than Tucker, who
is exactly the kind of person many likely would agree should receive the
death penalty: a person guilty of a heinous crime. Despite their claims of
guilt or innocence, Graham and Tucker assumed the same legal posture
relative to their post-conviction claims: both were found guilty, sentenced
to death, and subsequently pursued every legal option available to spare
their lives-including state and federal appeals, clemency petitions and
media campaigns to rally public support for their cases.
Because Graham and Tucker were engaged in similar legal processes,
the political nature of their narratives foreshadows the roles religion, race
and gender play in the death penalty and in perceptions African Americans
have of the death penalty. The legal system weighs heavily on those found
guilty of murder, and, as exemplified by the Tucker and Graham cases, part
of this weight includes a measure of moral and potentially religious value.
While the religious and moral implications of "guilt" are open questions,
the legal meaning of "guilty" has been outlined by courts. In Herrera v.
121. See Texas Department of Criminal Justice, supra note 57.
122. These statements were made by Vincente Arenas, a Houston television reporter. See Sue
Anne Pressley, Texas Executes Killer Karla Faye; "Baby, I Love You, " She Tells Husband, TORONTO
STAR, Feb., 4 1998, at Al.
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Collins, the Supreme Court addressed the weight of legal guilt, even if
evidence of actual innocence surfaces post-conviction.' 23 Leonel Herrera
was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in the State of
Texas in 1982.124 Ten years after Herrera's conviction, when the case was
headed to federal habeas proceedings, Herrera claimed he was "actually
innocent." 125 While much of the Court's decision explores the
particularities of federal habeas proceedings, 126 the Court also discusses
how claims of actual innocence should be viewed in post-conviction
proceedings. 127  In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserts
that, once a person is found guilty, "the presumption of innocence
disappears."'128  Conviction in a full and fair trial, despite later-presented
evidence, moves the debate from proof of innocence to proof of
Constitutional grounds for remedy from unfair process. 129 Thus, the Court
places all defendants found guilty of capital murder into one group: the
guilty. As a result, Graham's claims of innocence and Tucker's claims of
guilt did not alter their legal "guilt" from the point of conviction.
Finally, aside from the legal meaning of guilt, the invocation of the
word "innocence" in the Tucker and Graham cases explicates the multiple
meanings that are dependent on and intertwined with the identity of the
person at the center of the discussion. The simplistic notion of innocence
as whether the defendant did in fact commit the crime ignores the role of
race, religion and gender in death penalty cases. Indeed, the Supreme
Court began this discussion by bifurcating legal innocence from actual
innocence in Herrera.30 Though Herrera suggests at least two types of
innocence (actual and legal), does this sufficiently explain the political
usages of "innocence" in death penalty cases, especially when race,
religion and gender are central to the analysis?
123. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398-400 (1993).
124. Id. at 393.
125. Herrera claimed the eye-witness testimony used to convict him at trial was improperly
admitted. He also submitted an affidavit from his nephew who claimed to be in the car at the time that
his father, Raul Herrera, killed the two deputies. Also, a long-time friend of the Herrera brothers
submitted an affidavit saying that Raul Herrera, not Leonel, confessed to the murder. Id. at 393-97.
126. Habeas is "a writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that
the party's imprisonment is not illegal." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (Bryan A. Garner ed.,
1996). Death penalty cases can go through both state and federal habeas proceedings. Id.
127. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 399-400.
128. Id. at 399.
129. Id. at400.
130. Id. at 399-400.
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C. INNOCENCE COMPLICATED
Herrera is clear that actual innocence does not guarantee relief.13 1
Despite controversy over Herrera's legal reasoning, it stands as good
law. 132  For the purposes of this article, Herrera's legacy lies in its
complication of the meaning of innocence, because it suggests that multiple
meanings may impact the use of innocence in various death penalty
narratives. Graham and Tucker, while both legally guilty, used different
narratives in attempting to rescue themselves from execution. The final
sections of this article discuss alternative meanings of innocence suggested
by the Graham and Tucker cases.
i. Social Innocence
In thinking about the meaning of social innocence, one could argue
that Tucker's transformation made her socially innocent. After her
conviction, Tucker attempted to return to the protection of the bounded
community, which is that portion of the community protected from state-
wielded or state-sanctioned violence, as described by James Marquart and
his fellow authors. 133 The saliency of religion in this region made Tucker's
social innocence and clemency possible in the minds of many supporters.
Tucker's previous behavior could be ignored, making religion a kind of
passkey that re-framed Tucker as a life worth saving. In contrast, the
Graham case exemplifies how this passkey may not work for African
Americans on death row. To become socially innocent, or no longer
considered a social danger, a person must be cleansed of past behavior and
aligned with images elevating them to a position worthy of political
salvation. The pervasive image of the dangerous black criminal may have
blocked the possibility of Graham's social innocence and re-entry into
society; the possibility of social innocence for Tucker may have been
furthered by society's reluctance to execute women and, further, to protect
white women.
131. Id. at 400.
132. See generally Jennifer Breur, Habeas Corpus-Limited Review For Actual Innocence, 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943 (1994); Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenge of Actual
Innocence Claims After Herrera v. Collins, 71 TEMPLE L. REV. 489 (1998); Vivian Berger, Herrera v.
Collins: The Gateway of Innocence for Death-Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 943 (1994).
133. The bounded community refers to that aspect of the community that is protected from the
violent actions of the state. See JAMES MARQUART ET AL., THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, AND THE NEEDLE:
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS 17 (1994).
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Prior to the Civil Rights Movement, the African-American community
used the idea of social innocence as a political strategy.'34 In Constructing
African Americans as Minorities, historian Earl Lewis discusses the general
evolution of the African-American community from public danger to
injured citizens.' 35 Lewis argues that, as far back as 1900, African-
American institutions have "competed to establish blacks as injured
citizens rather than dangerous victimizers."' '36 Lewis makes special note of
the NAACP, whose legal arm has orchestrated important legal attacks on
the death penalty, in addition to legal attacks on other legal structures that
historically have subordinated African Americans. 137  According to
Lewis's reading of African-American political history from slavery to the
entrenchment of Jim Crow laws, blacks were viewed as a "threat" or a
"social danger."'138 Before African Americans could seek redress from the
denial of citizenship rights guaranteed to them by the Civil War
Constitutional Amendments, they had to become "socially innocent. ' 139
Religious, social and political organizations played important roles in this
transformation. 4 ' Unlike minorities in other contemporary political
systems who were fighting for separation from majority communities,
African Americans were fighting for inclusion and integration. 14 1 Before
integration was possible, they had to be viewed as citizens and members of
the protected community whose injuries required remedy. 142
Lewis argues that extra-legal and legal state violation conflation was
made possible by the public's belief that blacks were dangerous-both
physically and politically.143 The introduction of millions of newly-freed
slaves into the political process endangered the racial hierarchy of the
South, which had been constructed in slavery and re-affirmed in Jim
Crow. 144 The systemic violence inherent in the treatment of blacks in the
South was accompanied by a legal and political structure designed to
134. See generally Earl Lewis, Constructing African Americans as Minorities, in THE
CONSTRUCTION OF MINORITIES 15 (Andre Burguiere et al. eds., 2001).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 25.
137. See id. at 25-26.
138. Seeid. at 21.
139. See id. at 25-27.
140. See, e.g., CHARLES HENRY, CULTURE AND AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICS (1990); PAULA
GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN
AMERICA (1984).
141. See Lewis, supra note 134, at 28.
142. See id. at 17.
143. See id. at 21-25.
144. See id. at 21.
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disenfranchise and alienate blacks from the political process. 145
Additionally, the exclusion of African Americans from national civic and
social life "cemented a racialized public sphere."' 146 According to Lewis's
analysis, within that racialized public sphere, popular culture's
representation of African Americans played a key role in marginalizing
African Americans. 147 The presentation of black men as violent, criminal
and potential rapists allowed "scores to see blacks as the supreme
embodiment of danger."'' 4 8  The antidote for this danger was violence-
first extra-legal lynching and then legal, state-sanctioned execution. 149
Tucker followed a similar process of moral re-fashioning. She
transitioned from immoral beginnings, to physical danger, and finally to an
injured citizen who could demand political and legal remedies from the
unfair imposition of state policies-in this case the death penalty. Though
the groundswell of support for the sparing of Tucker's life was largely
attributed to her religious conversion, Tucker's religious transformation
was made palatable by her gender and racial identities, neither of which fit
the description of someone who should be executed. Just as African
Americans were prevented from gaining redress because of social and legal
norms, extant gender and racial norms actually supported the repositioning
of Tucker as socially innocent.
Though the prejudices concerning whiteness and femininity still may
exist in the historical thread of the South,150 tracing the role of race in
contemporary politics is more complicated. Political scientist Cathy Cohen
argues that the uneven integration of the African-American community into
the larger American social and political community suggests that past
strategies for community uplift have been supplanted by fragmentation in
145. See id. at 22.
146. See FRED HARRIS, SOMETHING WITHIN: RELIGION IN AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICAL
ACTIVISM 9 (1999).
147. See Lewis, supra note 134, at 23-24.
148. Id. at 24.
149. See id.
150. See generally CHANDLER DAVIDSON, BIRACIAL POLITICS: CONFLICT AND COALITION IN THE
METROPOLITAN SOUTH (1972). Though this analysis includes Houston as part of the South, there are
some who might challenge the categorization of Texas as such. While it might be harder to use a
general Southern historical analysis in an analysis of the death penalty statewide, Houston and other
parts of North, East and Southeast Texas fit relatively smoothly into "the South." Political scientist
Chandler Davidson, who has studied Houston politics for decades, argues that Houston and those
counties that border traditionally southern states like Arkansas and Louisiana should be considered part
of the "rim south"--those areas of states not traditionally considered Southern that share a historical,
economic and political culture similar to the deep South. See id.
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African American political advocacy. 15 1  Cohen argues that this
fragmentation has lead to a reliance on alternative political alliances for
marginalized groups within the African-American community (i.e., cross-
racial coalitions which have formed especially among opponents of the
death penalty). Cohen's work has additional implications for social
innocence as part of the politics of respectability employed by death row
inmates. Through fragmentation, the process of becoming socially
innocent may become an individual strategy for African Americans who
are marginalized within the black community. Members of these
subgroups, which Cohen categorizes as secondary marginalized groups,'
52
may be able to, if not re-enter the dominant community, successfully
trigger political resources of the indigenous community by becoming
"socially innocent."
In this analysis, the Graham case demonstrates the possibility of social
innocence for black death row inmates. Like Tucker, Graham claimed to
be a changed person. Those around Graham concurred, including his aunt,
Jennifer Clebourn:
Gary is a changed person. He has matured since he was 17 [the age
Graham was arrested]. He has had 12 years to think about what he's
done wrong. He knows those robberies he did was wrong [sic]. 153
Unlike the racial and gender norms that supported the authenticity of
Tucker's transformation, the racial and gender norms surrounding black
masculinity work against society perceiving Graham as anything more than
a murderer, even though Graham's transformation and claims of innocence
triggered a significant response in the African-American community.
While Graham may not have attained "social innocence," his narrative of
innocence and abuse by a racist state leads to a different conceptualization
of innocence.
ii. Innocence by Lynching
Unlike efforts to render inmates socially innocent, some narratives of
the death penalty automatically rehabilitate the inmate, without requisite
151. See CATHY COHEN, THE BOUNDARIES OF BLACKNESS: AIDS AND THE BREAKDOWN IN
BLACK POLITICS 9 (1999). For more discussion of past strategies of racial uplift, see Lewis, supra note
134. For a discussion of the historiography of black nationalism and racial uplift, see KEvIN K.
GAINES, UPLIFTING THE RACE: BLACK LEADERSHIP, POLITICS, AND CULTURE IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (1996).
152. See COHEN, supra note 151.
153. See Andrea Greene & Valerie Godines, Killer's Supporters Seek to Prevent His Execution,
HOU. CHRON., June 1, 1993, at A16.
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involvement of the inmate. In academic narratives of lynching, the person
lynched is articulated as innocent.154  This type of innocence
simultaneously articulates innocence and critiques the criminal justice
system. This article contends that the attention given to Graham was based
on his ability to juxtapose execution with lynching.
Following Reconstruction, anti-lynching activism became one of the
highest priorities on the black political agenda and the focus of much black
political activism. 155 Black activists declared that the justifications for mob
violence against blacks were mere fagades for the political oppression of
blacks. 156  The rhetoric of anti-lynching campaigns, even when
spearheaded by secular black organizations, sometimes took on a spiritual
tone. 157 While investigating a lynching where a black man was burned
alive before a white mob, James Weldon Johnson observed:
I tried to balance the sufferings of the miserable victim against the moral
degradation of Memphis, and the truth flashed over me that in large
measure the race question involves the saving of black America's body
and white America's soul. 158
While not arguing that "illegal lynchings were the sole factor" for the
1923 reform of the Texas death penalty statute, Marquart et al. argue that
the lines drawn between legal and illegal hangings "were often very thin"
because both were "administered as much to maintain the caste-like system
of domination as to even the scales of justice."' 15 9 Thus, lynching
necessarily was coupled with legal executions because of their twin uses as
forms of socially controlling formerly enslaved people and their
descendants.160
Thus, when Gary Graham invoked the imagery of lynching, 16 1 he
simultaneously proclaimed his innocence and reified the tentative
relationship between blacks and the state. Like lynching victims of the
past, Graham claimed that he was being "murdered" by an unfair criminal
justice system for a crime of which he was innocent; he also suggested to
154. See COLLINS, supra note 102, at 218-24.
155. See, e.g., GIDDINGS, supra note 140.
156. See GAINES, supra note 151, at 86 (discussing the response of black leadership to lynching).
157. See HAZEL CARBY, RACE MEN 46 (1998).
158. Id. James Weldon Johnson, Field Secretary for the NAACP, made this observation while
investigating the lynching of Ell Persons in 1917. Hazel Carby views this observation as an
improvisation on "the multiple meanings of DuBois' declaration that 'the problem of the Twentieth
Century is the problem of the color line'." Id.
159. See MARQUART ET AL., supra note 133, at 12.
160. See id. at 2.
161. See Texas Department of Criminal Justice, supra note 7.
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other blacks the possibility of a fate similar to his own. 162 Graham says as
much in his last statement: "This is a lynching that is happening in America
tonight."' 163  Graham's supporters also used religious tones. Robert
Muhammad, when asked whether a month long fast Graham supporters
were beginning was a hunger strike, replied:
This is not a hunger strike. A hunger strike is a political statement, and I
am not making a political statement. We are making a spiritual
statement .... We are here to stop the execution of an innocent man.164
Jesse Jackson described Graham's death as a "political sacrifice" 165
and compared George W. Bush to Pontius Pilate. 166 By aligning his story
with the lynching narrative, Graham activated the African-American
community in a way that other cases have not. 167
iii. Confession as Innocence
In death row inmates' attempts to re-fashion themselves as worthy of
salvation through religious transformation, the role of confession can affect
the public's perception of innocence. Thus, while Tucker's repetitive
confessions of guilt may have contributed to her public re-fashioning,
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. Michica Guillory, Graham Supporters Ready for Final Fight, HOU. DEFENDER, May 28-June
3, 2000, at 1.
165. See Capital Punishment, supra note 54.
166. A national review editorial criticized Jackson for making a comparison equating Graham to
Jesus Christ. See Lifeless Debate, supra note 54.
167. One of the important limitations of being perceived as innocent by alluding to the lynching
narrative is its highly gendered focus on black men. For example, the "strange fruit" that Billie Holiday
sings of tends to conjure images of black male bodies hanging from southern trees. See BILLIE
HOLIDAY, Strange Fruit, on BILLIE HOLIDAY (Commodore 1939); see also Songfacts, Strange Fruit by
Billie Holiday, http://www.songfacts.com/detail.phpid=543 (last visited Apr. 18, 2006). The power of
these combined race and gender narratives are affirmed by the near invisibility of African-American
women. For instance, the next woman set for execution after Karla Faye Tucker was an African-
American woman, Yvonne Sheppard. Mike Ward, Jesse Jackson Asks to Visit Condemned Woman;
Unlike Tucker-Before, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Mar. 21, 1998, at B2. Although Sheppard was
visited by Reverend Jesse Jackson at his own request, there was no Pat Robertson or Jerry Falwell. See
id. It is important to ask why the passionate critiques of the state and death penalty associated with
Graham were not present in Sheppard's case. Additionally, Graham's execution also highlights the
silencing of black women, as demonstrated by the experience of Bernadine Skillem, a black woman
whose testimony single-handedly convicted Graham. See Martin, supra note 11. As a black woman,
Skillem suffered harassment, from the press as well from within the African-American community, for
her unwavering stance that it was Graham she saw in that parking lot that night. See id. Graham's
supporters passed out leaflets in her neighborhood and near her church identifying her as the witness
who convicted Graham, which resulted in damage to her home and car. Id. Skillern filed suit against
ABC for harassing her at home after she had refused to open her door to grant them an interview. Id.
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Graham's professions of innocence may have heightened the desire of
some to see him executed.
Tucker's guilt became part of her "testimony,"'1 68 which she shared in
encounters with the media. For example, Tucker used the media to plead
her case to then-Governor George W. Bush and to the public. 169 In an open
letter to Governor Bush, Tucker proclaimed:
Even though I did murder Jerry Dean and Deborah Thornton that night
and not think anything of it back then, it is now the one thing I regret
most in my life and in the frame of mind I am now in it is something that
absolutely rips my guts out. I felt the pain of that night, and I feel the
pain that goes on every day with others because of what I did that night.
I know the evil that was in me then, and I know that what took place that
night was so horrible that only a monster could do it .... It is not who I
am today, and because of who I am today it makes it all the harder for
me to have to think back on that night and after that night, and a lot of
things I did while I was not saved. 170
The letter reiterates Tucker's acceptance of her guilt. By appealing
directly to Christian sentiments of the cleansing nature of confession, the
public nature of Tucker's campaign (though typically not perceived as a
campaign) constituted a significant challenge to the state's authority to
execute judgment.171
In Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and Literature,
author Peter Brooks argues that "the confessional rehearsal or repetition of
guilt is its own kind of performance, producing at the same time the excuse
or justification of guilt."' 72  Further, "it is the speech-act itself, which
simultaneously exonerates and inculpates."' 173  According to Brooks, "the
notion that possible redemption depends on a confession is deeply
168. I use the word "testimony" in reference to the Pentecostal act of public confession, as
opposed the legal act of telling the truth in legal proceedings. Both involve truth telling, but the
religious usage invokes a more expansive notion. The religious usage asserts that not only is the telling
a public good (i.e., a lesson to both listener and teller), but also it has a cleansing power that can remove
the taint of sins. Testimony as performance allows "the votary to specifly] her social location in the
group, and through repeated performances, signals to the community her more advanced status." See J.
Stephen Kroll-Smith, The Testimony as Performance: The Relationship of an Expressive Event to the
Belief System of Holiness Sect, 19 J. SCI. STUD. RELIGION 18 (1980). The performance aspect of
Tucker's testimony is discussed later in this article.
169. See Cooey, supra note 73, at 708.
170. Id.
171. Seeid. at 710.
172. PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING LAW AND LITERATURE 22 (2000).
173. Id.
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ingrained in our culture."' 174  However, Brooks argues later that "the
confessional impulse, considered to be redemptive can in fact produce a
sterile, passive, self-satisfied complicity in the negation of the possibility of
redemption."' 175  Though Brooks only mentions political instances of
confession, the Tucker case presents a prime example of the ambivalent
way confessions of guilt are understood both legally and politically. The
combined performance of evangelical Christianity, femininity and
continual confession of guilt wiped Tucker's slate clean. Despite repeated
admissions of guilt, the Tucker who committed those crimes was not the
Tucker on death row. While this ingrained notion of confession worked to
Tucker's benefit, Tucker ultimately failed when Governor Bush used her
own words to justify execution:
Like many touched by this case, I have sought guidance through
prayer .... I have concluded judgments about the heart and soul of an
individual on death row are best left to a higher authority.1 76
With these words, any possibility for redemption would be lost.
In contrast, Graham's ceaseless claims of innocence demonstrate how
the emphasis on confession can actually highlight guilt. Many articles on
Graham repeat his professions of innocence. 177 Graham's claim became
the mantle for his supporters and anti-death penalty activists. 178 Graham
was quoted shortly before his death, saying, "I die fighting for what I
believed in. Truth will come out., 179  That truth for Graham was his
innocence, but his failure to show contrition only fuelled political support
for his execution, and, according to Brooks's analysis, legal and cultural
support. Shortly before Graham's execution, George W. Bush responded
to Graham's claim of innocence:
As far as I'm concerned, there has not been one innocent person
executed since I've become governor. I know there is a lot of emotion
swirling around the case and I understand that. The death penalty is not
an easy subject for folks. I'm going to uphold the laws of the land and if
it costs me politically, it costs me politically. No one case is an easy
case. Obviously, those that get a lot of public attention increase the
degree of difficulty. I'm going to treat this case no differently than any
174. Id. at 112.
175. Id. at 166.
176. See Ratcliffe, supra note 2.
177. See, e.g., Quindlen, supra note 8; Garcia, supra note 8; Greene, supra note 9; Dorsett &
Hunger, supra note 12.
178. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 9; Perry, supra note 37; Rule, supra note 37; Nichols, supra
note 40; Warren, supra note 50; Warren, supra note 52.
179. Capital Punishment, supra note 54.
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other case that has come across my desk. I'm going to uphold the laws
of the land. I believe the system is fair and just. 180
Bush reaffirmed Graham's guilt and his plans to uphold the legally
prescribed punishment. Even though Graham proclaimed his
transformation, his unwillingness to confess afforded no hesitation from the
final legal authority, the Governor. Thus, the American cultural preference
for confession highlights the obscuration of race and religion through the
notion of innocence by confession.
IV. CONCLUSION
By analyzing concrete cases, this article explores the way that
contemporary narratives relying on religion merge with past narratives of
gender and race. While the simplicity of innocence or guilt is challenged
by Herrera, when the bifurcation created by Herrera is extended, other
constructions of innocence-social innocence, innocence by lynching and
confession as innocence-can be constructed as woven into the cases of
Karla Faye Tucker and Gary Graham. The paradigmatic cases of Graham
and Tucker help by either crystallizing or shattering perceptions through
extremely public snapshots of the death penalty. By analyzing the
operation of race, religion and innocence in such cases, this dynamic
relationship may manifest itself in other areas of law and society.
180. See Michica Guillory, The Graham Case: What Does It All Mean?, HOU. DEFENDER, June
25-July 1, 2000, at 1.
[Vol. 15:2
HeinOnline  -- 15 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 298 2005-2006
